Victor v. Nebraska: The Reasonable Doubt Dilemma by Law Review, North Carolina
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Volume 73 | Number 4 Article 7
4-1-1995
Victor v. Nebraska: The Reasonable Doubt
Dilemma
North Carolina Law Review
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr
Part of the Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in North Carolina Law
Review by an authorized editor of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact law_repository@unc.edu.
Recommended Citation
North Carolina Law Review, Victor v. Nebraska: The Reasonable Doubt Dilemma, 73 N.C. L. Rev. 1709 (1995).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr/vol73/iss4/7
Victor v. Nebraska: The "Reasonable Doubt" Dilemma
Physicists call it entropy'-the principle that the level of disorder
within a system can only increase. If jurists were searching for an
example of this phenomenon in the legal world, a jury instruction
defining "reasonable doubt" might be the perfect analog: The more
one tries to explain the concept, the more one compounds the already
confusing language, leaving jurors without "the vaguest sense of what
is going on."2
A growing body of literature has proven that jurors often do not
comprehend the instructions given them, and that efforts to explain
the instructions may actually make matters worse? An instruction
defining reasonable doubt is especially likely to create confusion,4
1. Entropy is the measure of "randomness evolving from all physical processes by
which their energies tend to degrade into heat." 25 THE NEW ENCYCLOPAEDIA
BRITANNICA 674 (15th ed. 1993). This randomness, or disorder, can only increase over
the positive direction of time. Id.
2. Panel One: Judge-Jury Communications: Improving Communications and
Understanding Bias, Apr. 10, 1992, 68 IND. L.J. 1037, 1038 (1993) [hereinafter Panel One]
(statement of Steven J. Adler). Steven Adler, news editor for law of the Wall Street
Journal, observed that jury instructions are inherently confusing because
[y]ou are dealing with two very separate world views: the world view of the
lawyers and the judges who are trying to fit instructions into a scheme that will
appeal to appellate court judges and the world view of the audience-in this case,
the people trying to make the decisions: the jury.
Id.
3. For a thorough empirical study of juror comprehension, see Robert P. Charrow
& Veda R. Charrow, Making Legal Language Understandable: A Psycholinguistic Study
of Jury Instructions, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1306 (1979). The authors conclude that (1) the
standard jury instruction is not well understood by jurors; (2) this incomprehensibility is
due largely to linguistic constructions; and (3) improved constructions can dramatically
improve comprehension. Id. at 1358; see also Robert F. Forston, Sense and Non-Sense:
Jury Trial Communication, 1975 B.Y.U. L. REv. 601, 612-23 (surveying empirical research
which indicates that jury instructions are often misunderstood); Walter W. Steele, Jr. &
Elizabeth G. Thomburg, Jury Instructions: A Persistent Failure to Communicate, 67 N.C.
L. REV. 77,109 (1988) (conducting experiments on Texas jurors and concluding that "[t]he
problem is evident: juror comprehension of their instructions is pitifully low"); David U.
Strawn & Raymond W. Buchanan, Jury Confusion: A Threat to Justice, 59 JUDICATURE
478, 480 (1976) ("The results of the study confirmed the fear of many trial lawyers and
judges that jurors, even after receiving instructions, may not understand the law suf-
ficiently.").
4. See Miles v. United States, 103 U.S. 304, 312 (1880) ("Attempts to explain the
term 'reasonable doubt' do not usually result in making it any clearer to the minds of the
jury."); accord Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121, 140 (1954); Dunbar v. United
States, 156 U.S. 185, 199 (1895).
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even among those trained in the law.' One recent study surveyed
two groups of jurors to examine their understanding of the reasonable
doubt standard.6 One group was given a model definition of the
term while the other received no instruction.7 While a majority of
the uninstructed group equated a reasonable doubt with "any
doubt,"8 the instructed group showed only a minimal increase in
understanding.9 Both groups exhibited confusion about whether
jurors are allowed to draw their own inferences from the evidence,
and the survey suggested that, in the particular area tested, "[t]he
comprehension rate actually declined as a result of exposure to
instruction."' The researchers concluded that the "minimal and
even negative effects" of the instructions should raise serious concern
about whether an instructed juror understands the meaning of
reasonable doubt." More generally, research in the area of juror
comprehension leads one to ask whether and how reasonable doubt
should be defined. 2
The difficulty of defining reasonable doubt recently came to the
fore in Victor v. Nebraska,3 a case in which the United States
Supreme Court examined the constitutionality of two different jury
instructions.'4 The Court had to decide in both cases whether there
was a "reasonable likelihood that the jury understood the instruc-
5. See Skidmore v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 167 F.2d 54,64 (2d Cir.) ("[O]ften the judge
must state [instructions on the law] to the jury with such niceties that many lawyers do not
comprehend them, and it is impossible that the jury can."), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 816
(1948), quoted in Michael J. Saks, Judicial Nullification, 68 IND. LJ. 1281, 1282-83 (1993).
6. See Geoffrey P. Kramer & Dorean M. Koenig, Michigan Juror Comprehension
Project, 23 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 401, 414-16 (1990).
7. Id. at 414.
8. Id.
9. Id. The researchers concluded that the observed difference between the groups
was likely the result of chance factors, and that the comprehension rate between the two
groups probably did not differ at all. Id. at 414 n.41. In fact, uninstructed jurors who were
highly educated exhibited the greatest understanding. Id.
10. Id. at 414-15.
11. Id. at 416. Moreover, one critic argues that when jurors do not understand an
element of an instruction they will simply ignore it. See Panel One, supra note 2, at 1039
(statement of Steven J. Adler).
12. The research also raises serious concern about general communication problems
in the courtroom. See Fred H. Cate & Newton N. Minow, Communicating with Juries, 68
IND. L.L 1101, 1108 (1993) ("Not only are the instructions often opaque to jurors, trials
themselves are often conducted in a language that is wholly and needlessly foreign to the
jury.").
13. 114 S. Ct. 1239 (1994).
14. Victor is a consolidation of two cases: People v. Sandoval, 841 P.2d 862 (Cal.
1993) (en banc), and State v. Victor, 457 N.W.2d 431 (Neb. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S.
1127 (1991).
1710 [Vol. 73
1995] REASONABLE DOUBT 1711
tions" in a manner that would allow conviction on proof insufficient
to meet the reasonable doubt standard.'5 Given the Court's belief
that the American criminal justice system rests firmly on the "crucial
assumption... that juries follow the instructions given them by the
trial judge,"' 6 one might suspect that the Court would voice concern,
even alarm, over the large body of empirical data indicating that
jurors often do not comprehend instructions.'7 In fact, the Court did
just the opposite.
This Note focuses on the significance of the reasonable doubt
standard in criminal trials 8 and reveals that although the standard
plays a critical role in such trials, it defies easy explanation.' After
15. Victor, 114 S. Ct. at 1243.
16. Parker v. Randolph, 442 U.S. 62, 73 (1979). For a thorough exploration of this
Parker assumption, see J. Alexander Tanford, The Law and Psychology of Jury
Instructions, 69 NEB. L. REV. 71, 72-73 (1990).
17. In a recent North Carolina antitrust case, Liggett Group, Inc. v. Brown &
Williamson Tobacco Corp., 748 F. Supp. 344 (M.D.N.C. 1990), affd, 964 F.2d 335 (4th Cir.
1992), the court issued a complex, 80 page jury instruction. One part of the instruction
read as follows:
The outer boundaries of a product market are determined by the reasonable
interchangeability of use or the cross-elasticity of supply and demand between the
product itself and substitutes for it. All of these factors must be examined in
determining whether a well-defined submarket exists in a broader market.
However, the existence of a submarket or its lack of existence does not require
the presence or absence of all of the factors.
Panel One, supra note 2, at 1038 (statement of Steven J. Adler). Adler commented on this
portion of the Liggett Group instruction:
I had to read this seven or eight times to even have the vaguest sense of what it
meant. The typical juror on this jury was a textile worker, but he could have
been a Ph.D. and it would not have mattered.... [T]he typical juror... [had
only] a high school education. These jurors found Greensboro to be a very
difficult city to get around because they were mostly from the surrounding
countryside, and one of them had never used a parking meter before.
Id. Yet juror confusion is not limited to complex antitrust cases. Even the most basic
legal concepts can lead to much confusion. Id at 1039 (noting that jurors often have great
difficulty with concepts such as "representation," "conversion," "tacitly," "executing," and
other terms commonly used in jury instructions); see also Saks, supra note 5, at 1282-83.
Professor Saks offers an interesting view on why "judges routinely nullify the law by
rendering it meaningless, thereby compelling jurors to invent the law themselves." Id. at
1283. One reason judges nullify the law is to give themselves more control over the
outcome of the case. Id. at 1290. "Where the judge believes that the desired outcome of
the case would be impeded by the law," Professor Saks explains, "the judge can nullify the
law and allow the jury to use its equities to reach the result the judge desires." Id.
Similarly, when the judge feels that the law would lead the jurors to the desired result, the
judge can make the law more accessible to jurors. Id. Also, the judge can use nonverbal
communication, or a special verdict, reserving the application of law to itself, to influence
the verdict in subtle ways. Id.
18. See infra notes 57-62 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 63-125 and accompanying text.
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reviewing the factual circumstances in both cases at issue in Victor,"
this Note delineates the historical treatment of reasonable doubt in
jury instructions. 21 It then examines the Court's analysis in Victor
and illustrates that, in its preoccupation with the legal sufficiency of
the instructions, the Court failed to see that the instructions may have
been incomprehensible to the jurors who were asked to apply
them.2 This Note concludes that the Court has created a paradox
of context: While emphasizing that the language in jury instructions
must be judged in the context of the instruction as a whole,' the
Court ignores the fact that those instructions are often so far removed
from the context of the trial and juror comprehension that they are
rendered meaningless. 2a
In both cases the Court examined in Victor, the petitioners were
convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to death.' Petitioner
Arthur Alfred Sandoval shot three men, killing two of the them,
during a gang-related dispute in Los Angeles on October 14, 1984.26
About two weeks later, Sandoval entered the home of a man who had
given information to the police about the shootings and murdered
him.' He then killed the informant's wife because she had wit-
nessed her husband's murder. 8  At Sandoval's trial, the jury was
instructed as follows:
A defendant in a criminal action is presumed to be innocent
until the contrary is proved, and in case of a reasonable
doubt whether his guilt is satisfactorily shown, he is entitled
to a verdict of not guilty. This presumption places upon the
State the burden of proving him guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt. Reasonable doubt.., is not a mere possible doubt;
because everything relating to human affairs, and depending
on moral evidence, is open to some possible or imaginary
doubt. It is that state of the case which, after the entire
comparison and consideration of all the evidence, leaves the
minds of the jurors in that condition that they cannot say
20. See infra notes 25-56 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 57-125 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 130-205 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 135-40 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 206-13 and accompanying text.
25. Victor, 114 S. Ct. at 1244, 1249.
26. Id. at 1243. Sandoval served five years in state prison for a prior attempted
murder conviction and was released in May of 1984. H.G. Reza, Three Die in Separate
Gang-Related Shootings, L.A. TIMEs, Jan. 6, 1985, at Al.




they feel an abiding conviction, to a moral certainty, of the
truth of the charge.29
The jury convicted Sandoval on four counts of first degree murder,30
for which he received the death penalty and a life sentence without
possibility of parole.31 Sandoval's convictions and sentences were
affirmed by the California Supreme Court.32
On December 26, 1987, petitioner Clarence Victor entered the
home of an eighty-two-year-old woman and beat her with a pipe.3
Victor then slit her throat with a knife, killing her.' The instruc-
tions given at Victor's trial were similar, though not identical, to those
in Sandoval's case. The judge at Victor's trial instructed the jury as
follows:
"Reasonable doubt" is such a doubt as would cause a
reasonable and prudent person, in one of the graver and
more important transactions of life, to pause and hesitate
before taking the represented facts as true and relying and
acting thereon. It is such a doubt as will not permit you,
after full, fair, and impartial consideration of all the
evidence, to have an abiding conviction to a moral certainty,
of the guilt of the accused. ... You may find an accused
guilty upon the strong probabilities of the case, provided such
probabilities are strong enough to exclude any doubt of his
guilt that is reasonable. A reasonable doubt is an actual and
substantial doubt arising from the evidence, from the facts or
circumstances shown by the evidence, or from the lack of
evidence on the part of the state, as distinguished from a
doubt arising from mere possibility, from bare imagination,
or from fanciful conjecture. s
29. Id. at 1244.
30. Id. at 1243. A sentence of death was imposed because the jury found that
Sandoval used a firearm in the commission of each murder and found the special
circumstance of multiple murder under the California Penal Code. Id. at 1243-44.
31. Id. at 1244. The jury imposed the death sentence for Sandoval's murder of the
informant's wife, while the other three murders carried a life sentence. Id.
32. People v. Sandoval, 841 P.2d 862 (Cal. 1992) (en banc).
33. Victor, 114 S. Ct. at 1249. Victor confessed that upon entering the victim's home,
he "struck the victim with his hands and knocked her down and then struck her in the
head three times with a pipe which he ... carried in his car for protection." State v.
Victor, 457 N.W.2d 431, 437 (Neb. 1990), affd, 114 S. Ct. 1239 (1994).
34. Victor, 114 S. Ct. at 1249. Victor claimed that some blue cord got tangled around
the victim's neck and that he used his pocketknife to cut the cord loose. Victor, 457
N.W.2d at 437. Victor claimed that he then left the victim's house and threw away his
knife, the blue cord, and the pipe. Id
35. Victor, 114 S. Ct. at 1249 (emphasis added by the Court).
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Victor was also convicted of first degree murder and received a
sentence of death,36 which was affirmed by the Nebraska Supreme
Court.3
7
Both petitioners contended that the jury instructions given at
their respective trials violated their due process rights because the
language used to explain the reasonable doubt standard to the jury,
in effect, lessened the prosecution's burden of proof 38 The Supreme
Court granted certiorari-in an area of the law it rarely
reviews 39-ostensibly to clarify the confusion surrounding the
meaning of reasonable doubt.' The Court unanimously upheld the
California jury instruction in petitioner Sandoval's case, rejecting San-
doval's claim that references to the phrases "moral evidence" and
"moral certainty" rendered the charge unconstitutional.41 The Court
held that the Sandoval instruction was significantly different from the
one at issue in Cage v. Louisiana,42 the only case in which the Court
has held unconstitutional a jury instruction defining reasonable
doubt.43 Although the Cage instruction contained language similar
to the Sandoval charge, the Court distinguished the two, arguing that
the Cage instruction was presented in a different context. 4 The
Court also rejected Sandoval's argument that equating a reasonable
doubt with "not a mere possible doubt" lessened the government's
burden of proof4 The Court concluded that, given the instructions
as a whole, the jurors were reasonably likely to understand the charge
in a manner consistent with the reasonable doubt standard.46
36. Id. Victor had previously been convicted of murder. Id. at 1249.
37. Victor, 457 N.W.2d at 431.
38. See Victor, 114 S. Ct. at 1246-47, 1250.
39. See Tanford, supra note 16, at 88 ("Since jury instruction practices tend to be
matters of local procedure, the Supreme Court rarely reviews them directly."); cf.
Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 527 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., concurring) ("I am loath
to see this Court go into the business of parsing jury instructions given by state trial courts
... ."). Recently, however, the Court has been more willing to hear jury instruction cases.
Cf Sullivan v. Louisiana, 113 S. Ct. 2078, 2081-82 (1993) (holding that a constitutionally
deficient reasonable doubt instruction is harmful error per se); Cage v. Louisiana, 498 U.S.
39, 404-41 (1990) (per curiam) (holding unconstitutional a reasonable doubt instruction).
40. See infra notes 63-125 and accompanying text.
41. Victor, 114 S. Ct. at 1245-48.
42. 498 U.S. 39 (1990) (per curiam).
43. See Victor, 114 S. Ct. at 1243.
44. Id. at 1248.
45. Id. at 1248-49.
46. Id. at 1247-49, 1251.
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The Court split in its analysis of the Victor instruction.47 As in
the Sandoval portion of the opinion, the Court's analysis consisted
largely of a comparison between the Victor instruction and the one in
Cage.' Although the majority found the Victor instruction to be
more problematic than the one in Sandoval's case,49 the Court
nonetheless upheld the charge, distinguishing the Cage instruction as
having been presented in a significantly different context than the
instruction given at Victor's trial.5' The Court rejected Victor's
objections to the use of the phrases "substantial doubt," "moral
certainty," and "strong probabilities" in his jury instruction, and
concluded that, as a whole, the instructions correctly conveyed the
concept of reasonable doubt.5'
Justice Blackmun's separate opinion,52 concurring in part and
dissenting in part, criticized the majority's treatment of the Victor
instruction, arguing that no meaningful difference existed between the
context of the Cage instruction and the instruction in Victor's case.53
Interestingly, Justice Blackmun, like the majority, made the same dis-
tinction between the actual language in the instruction and that
language taken in context;' Justice Blackmun simply read the Victor
instruction differently.5  Perhaps more important, neither the
majority nor Justice Blackmun addressed the issue of actual juror
comprehension of jury instructions.5 6
While the idea that a criminal conviction should be supported by
proof beyond a reasonable doubt has been a fundamental principle in
criminal trials since the beginning of our nation's history, the Court
47. Id. at 1242. Justice O'Connor delivered the opinion of the Court. Id. With
respect to Part I, the opinion was unanimous. Id. Justice Ginsburg joined only Parts II,
I-B, and IV of the opinion. Id. Justice Blackmun and Justice Souter joined only Part
II. Id. Justice Kennedy filed a separate concurring opinion. Id. Justice Blackmun filed
a separate opinion, concurring in part and dissenting in part, joined by Justice Souter in
all but Part II. Id.
48. Id. at 1250-51.
49. See id. at 1250.
50. Id. at 1250-51.
51. Id.
52. Justice Blackmun was joined in part by Justice Souter. Id. at 1254 (Blackmun, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
53. Id. at 1254 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
54. Id. at 1257-59 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
55. See id. (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
56. Perhaps the only opinions voicing concerns about actual juror comprehension are
Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion and Justice Ginsburg's separate opinion, concurring
in part and concurring in the judgment. However, both Justice Kennedy's and Justice
Ginsburg's treatments of the issue seem inadequate at best. See infra notes 209-12 and
accompanying text.
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had never explicitly held that the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth or
Fourteenth Amendments afforded such protection to criminal
defendants until 1970.'7 In In re Winship, 58 the Court solidified this
long-recognized legal axiom, stating that the reasonable doubt
standard provides "concrete substance for the presumption of
innocence-that bedrock 'axiomatic and elementary' principle whose
enforcement lies at the foundation of the administration of our
criminal law."59  Moreover, the Court observed, the reasonable
doubt standard is a reflection of the value society places on liberty.'
It reminds the juror that a "criminal prosecution has at stake interests
of immense importance. ,61 Perhaps Justice Harlan's concurring
opinion in Winship presents the most compelling justification for the
standard: "[T]he requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt in
a criminal case [is] bottomed on a fundamental value determination
of our society that it is far worse to convict an innocent man than to
let a guilty man go free."'62
Despite the "constitutional stature"63 of the reasonable doubt
standard, the Court has offered little guidance on how to define it.'
As early as 1887, the Court stated that, although the reasonable doubt
standard is mandated by due process, trial courts are not required to
57. See In Re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).
58. Id.
59. Id. at 363 (quoting Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 453 (1895)).
60. Id. at 363-64.
61. Id. at 363.
62. Id. at 372 (Harlan, J., concurring); see Charles R. Nesson, Reasonable Doubt and
Permissive Inferences: The Value of Complexity, 92 HARV. L. REv. 1187, 1195 (1979)
(arguing that a central purpose of the reasonable doubt standard is to promote society's
confidence in criminal jury verdicts); cf. Victor, 114 S. Ct. at 1257 (Blackmun, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (contending that "a central purpose of the
[reasonable doubt] instructions is to minimize the jury's sense of responsibility for the
conviction of those who may be innocent").
One scholar has argued that the reasonable doubt test was initially introduced by the
prosecution in the latter half of the eighteenth century to lessen the protections afforded
to the accused under the then-standard "any doubt" test. See Anthony Morano, A
Reexamination of the Reasonable Doubt Rule, 55 B.U. L. REV. 507,514-15 (1975). But cf.
Barbara J. Shapiro, "To A Moral Certainty': Theories of Knowledge and Anglo-American
Juries 1600-1850, 38 HASTINGS LJ. 153, 170-71 (1986) (arguing that the "beyond a
reasonable doubt" test was a clarification of the notion of moral certainty and satisfied
belief rather than a replacement of the "any doubt" test).
63. Winship, 397 U.S. at 364.
64. See Jon 0. Newman, Beyond "Reasonable Doubt", 68 N.Y.U. L. REv. 979,982-83
(1993); Henry A. Diamond, Note, Reasonable Doubt: To Define or Not to Define, 90
COLUM. L. REv. 1716, 1716 (1990). Yet the Court has never held that reasonable doubt
is undefinable or that trial courts should not define the term. Victor, 114 S. Ct. at 1253
(Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
1716 [Vol. 73
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define the phrase, nor are they prohibited from doing so. 5 In the
same manner, the Court later held in Taylor v. Kentucky66 that the
Constitution does not require the use of any specific language to
convey the concept of reasonable doubt.' However, just one year
after Taylor, the Court in Jackson v. Virginia' ruled that simply
instructing a jury to apply the reasonable doubt standard does not
satisfy the constitutional mandate of Winship.69 In Justice Stewart's
words, "[t]he Winship doctrine requires more than simply a trial
ritual."7 Moreover, the reasonable doubt standard needed to be
linked in some manner to the task of assessing the sufficiency of the
evidence.71 Rather than attempting to establish an all-encompassing
65. See Hopt v. Utah, 120 U.S. 430, 440-41 (1887). In Hopt, the defendant appealed
his first degree murder conviction and sentence of death, contending in part that the
instruction defining reasonable doubt was constitutionally flawed. Id. at 432. Hopt
illustrates that the Court has struggled with the concept of reasonable doubt for more than
a century: "It is difficult to conceive what amount of conviction would leave the mind of
a juror free from a reasonable doubt .... Out of the domain of exact sciences there is
no absolute certainty." Id. at 429. The Hopt Court also noted that the reasonable doubt
standard "may be, and often is, rendered obscure by attempts at definition, which serve
to create doubts instead of removing them." Id. at 441.
66. 436 U.S. 478 (1978).
67. See id at 485-86. Focusing primarily on the "presumption of innocence"
requirement, a concept closely related to the idea of establishing "guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt," the Court stated in Taylor. "While the use of the particular phrase
'presumption of innocence--or any other form of words-may not be constitutionally
mandated, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment must be held to
safeguard 'against dilution of the principle that guilt is to be established beyond a
reasonable doubt.' " Id (quoting Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 503 (1976)).
68. 443 U.S. 307 (1979).
69. Id. at 316-17. Jon 0. Newman, Chief Judge of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit, observed that two years prior to Jackson, Justice Stewart, who
wrote the Jackson opinion, "unsuccessfully urged the Court to decide whether due process
is violated by a conviction 'where the evidence cannot fairly be considered sufficient to
establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.'" Newman, supra note 64, at 987 n.40 (refere-
ncing Freeman v. Zahradnick, 429 U.S. 1111, 1116 (1977) (Stewart, J., dissenting from
denial of certiorari)).
70. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 316-17.
71. Id. at 317 ("A doctrine establishing so fundamental a substantive constitutional
standard must also require that the factfinder will rationally apply that standard to the
facts in evidence."); see Newman, supra note 64, at 987. Chief Judge Newman noted what
he sees as an inconsistency in Jackson, explaining that the Court stated the critical inquiry
was whether the record evidence could support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt, yet then stated one page later that "the relevant question is whether ... any
rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a
reasonable doubt." Id. at 987-88 (quoting Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319 (Court's emphasis)).
Chief Judge Newman further contended that the "any rational trier" standard is less
rigorous than the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard, although the Court never
indicated that it even realized it was creating two different standards. Id. Further, a
number of federal and state courts have applied the arguably less protective "any rational
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definition for the phrase, or a specific evidentiary threshold,72 the
Court merely set the broad constitutional boundaries: Some type of
explanation for the concept of reasonable doubt seemed necessary,
but the required elements of such an explanation were far from clear.
Perhaps the only certainty was that the Constitution mandates the
use of the reasonable doubt standard in some manner consistent with
the Due Process Clause.7 3 To determine whether a trial court has
applied the reasonable doubt standard in a constitutional manner, the
Court developed a two-prong analysis.74 The first half of the test
stems from the Court's decision in Holland v. United States,75 which
held that "taken as a whole, the instructions [must] correctly conve[y]
the concept of reasonable doubt to the jury."7 6 A corollary to the
first prong of this test is that there is no single way to define
reasonable doubt.' As a result, a wide range of terminology has
been used to explain the concept to the jury.78 The second prong of
the analysis results from the Court's decision in Estelle v. McGuire.79
In Estelle, the Court held that the proper inquiry is not whether the
jury could have interpreted the instruction in an unconstitutional
trier" standard, leading Chief Judge Newman to conclude that the reasonable doubt
standard must be made into an enforceable rule of law to alleviate its ambiguities. Id. at
988, 990-95.
72. Even if this were possible, the Court could still not require the state courts to
adopt the definition. See Victor, 114 S. Ct. at 1248 (stating that the Court cannot exercise
supervisory powers over state courts).
73. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).
74. See Morley v. Stenberg, 828 F. Supp. 1413,1417 (D. Neb. 1993), rev'd, 25 F.3d 687
(8th Cir. 1994).
75. 348 U.S. 121 (1954).
76. Id. at 140. Alternatively, even if a definition of reasonable doubt passes
constitutional muster, the Court, or any federal court, could still potentially reverse a
conviction if the Court does not find that instruction acceptable. See United States v.
Hasting, 461 U.S. 499,505 (1983) ("[I]n the exercise of supervisory powers, federal courts
may, within limits, formulate procedural rules not specifically required by the Constitution
or the Congress.... [in order] to preserve judicial integrity by ensuring that a conviction
rests upon appropriate considerations."); accord United States v. Williams 20 F.3d 125,
128-29 (5th Cir.), cert denied, 115 S. Ct. 239 (1994).
77. Professor Wigmore keenly noted that there is no magic language that conveys the
idea of reasonable doubt: "The truth is that no one has yet invented or discovered a mode
of measurement for the intensity of human belief. Hence there can be yet no successful
method of communicating intelligibly... a sound method of self-analysis for one's belief."
Winship, 397 U.S. 358,369 (1970) (quoting 9 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE 325 (3d ed. 1940)).
78. See infra notes 82-89 and accompanying text.




manner, but whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury ap-
plied it in an unconstitutional manner."'
Exercising the broad discretion the Court has given them, trial
judges have described reasonable doubt as a "real doubt";' an
"actual and substantial doubt";s3 a doubt to a "moral certainty";'
a doubt to a "reasonable certainty";' a doubt that would cause a
person to "hesitate to act";86 a "subjective state of certitude";' a
"doubt based on 'reason' ";8 and a host of similar ideas cast in
different language.89 Yet lower courts are not free to define the
term however they please. In Cage v. Louisiana,' for the first (and
only) time, the Court held unconstitutional a jury instruction defining
reasonable doubt.9' The jury instruction in Cage provided in
relevant part:
[A reasonable doubt] is one that is founded upon a real
tangible substantial basis and not upon mere caprice and
conjecture. It must be such doubt as would give rise to a
grave uncertainty, raised in your mind by reasons of the
unsatisfactory character of the evidence or lack thereof A
reasonable doubt is not a mere possible doubt. It is an
actual substantial doubt. It is a doubt that a reasonable man
81. Id at 482 & n.4; see also Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370, 380 (1989) (same).
82. E.g., United States v. Daniels, 986 F.2d 451,456 (11th Cir. 1993), cert denied, 114
S. Ct. 1615 (1994).
83. E.g., Smith v. State, 588 So. 2d 561,568 (Ala. Crim. App. 1991); see also supra text
accompanying note 35 (referencing the Victor instruction).
84. E.g., People v. Sims, 853 P.2d 992, 1024 (Cal. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2782
(1994); see also supra text accompanying notes 29,35 (referencing the Sandoval and Victor
instructions, respectively).
85. E.g., Bradford v. State, 412 S.E.2d 534, 536 (Ga. 1992).
86. E.g., United States v. Holland, 348 U.S. 121, 140 (1954); cf. supra text accom-
panying note 35 (referencing the use of a variant phrase in the Victor instruction).
87. E.g., Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 360 (1972).
88. E.g., Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 317 (1979). But cf. Victor, 114 S. Ct. at
1252 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) ("Jury comprehen-
sion is scarcely advanced when a court 'defines' reasonable doubt as 'doubt ... that is
reasonable.' ").
89. See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 328 F.2d 864, 867-68 (2d Cir. 1964) (defining a
reasonable doubt as "one for which when asked what it is by a fellow juror, 'you can give
a reason ... that indicates that it is a reasonable doubt' "); Murphy v. United States, 33
F.2d 896, 896 (3d Cir.) (equating a reasonable doubt with "a doubt for which some sound
reason can be assigned in your minds"), cerL denied, 280 U.S. 584 (1929).
90. 498 U.S. 39 (1990) (per curiam).
91. Id. at 40-41. However, in Cage the Court did not even attempt to define
reasonable doubt; rather its effect was directed more toward regulation of the reasonable
doubt standard. See id.
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can seriously entertain. What is required is not an absolute
or mathematical certainty, but a moral certainty.2
According to the Court, this instruction contained three questionable
phrases: "grave uncertainty"; "actual substantial doubt"; and "moral
certainty."'93 In finding the Cage instruction unconstitutional, the
Court stated:
It is plain to us that the words "substantial" and "grave," as
they are commonly understood, suggest a higher degree of
doubt than is required for acquittal under the reasonable
doubt standard. When those statements are then considered
with the reference to "moral certainty," rather than eviden-
tiary certainty, it becomes clear that a reasonable juror could
have interpreted the instruction to allow a finding of guilt
based on a degree of proof below that required by the Due
Process Clause.94
Although Cage soon became the benchmark for the validity of
reasonable doubt instructions, the holding in Cage was not so clear.
The uncertainty surrounding Cage stemmed from the relationship
among the three questionable phrases.' It was not clear whether
these three phrases had to be presented in the Cage context for an
instruction to violate the reasonable doubt standard. Also unclear
was whether all three phrases-"moral certainty," "actual substantial
doubt," and "grave uncertainty"-had to be present, although many
courts have held that all three Cage phrases are clearly required.96
The Cage opinion seemed to suggest that these three terms were not
"poison pills," which when used in isolation could impair an entire
jury instruction. 7 However, two recent cases, one decided by the
92. Id. at 40 (emhasis added by the Court). The Court recently held that a Cage error
is plain error per se. See Sullivan v. Louisiana, 113 S. Ct. 2078, 2081 (1993) (holding that
the Fifth and Sixth Amendments are interrelated, and an instruction that violates the
beyond a reasonable doubt standard also denies the defendant's Sixth Amendment right
to a jury trial).
93. Cage, 498 U.S. at 41.
94. Id.
95. See supra text accompanying note 93.
96. See, e.g., Coral v. State, 628 So. 2d 954, 984 (Ala. Crim. App. 1992) ("Obviously,
it was not the use of any one of the terms in Cage, but rather the combination of all three
that rendered the charge in Cage unconstitutional."), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1387 (1994);
Bradford v. State, 412 S.E.2d 534,536 (Ga. 1992) ("In Cage, it is clear that it was both the
definition of reasonable doubt, which impermissibly equated reasonable doubt with a
'grave uncertainty' and an 'actual substantial doubt,' coupled with the reference to 'moral
and reasonable certainty' that invalidated the jury instruction.") (quoting Starr v. State, 410
S.E.2d 180, 182 (Ga. App. 1991)).




Supreme Court of North Carolina98 and one by a federal district
court,99 support this poison pill interpretation of Cage.
In State v. Bryant," the North Carolina Supreme Court held
that the crucial term condemned by the Court in Cage was "moral
certainty," and that "a jury instruction which emphasizes what is good
or bad-a moral judgment, rather than truth-is an evidentiary
judgment, and is inconsistent with the role of the jury in deciding the
guilt or innocence of the defendant."'' The dissent in Bryant
criticized the court's broad reading of Cage, noting that the majority's
decision conflicted with the "clear dictate" of "virtually every other
appellate court in the land that has considered the matter. ' ' "m In
Morley v. Stenberg, °3 a federal district court similarly interpreted
Cage broadly. 4 The Morley court held that Cage does not mandate
a term-by-term comparison between the language found improper in
Cage and the language of a challenged instruction, nor does the Cage
opinion suggest that an instruction will violate due process only if it
contains the exact terminology that impaired the Cage instruction.'0 5
The Morley court concluded that the phrases "actual and substantial
doubt," "moral certainty," and "strong probabilities," when used
together or in isolation, unconstitutionally lessen the prosecution's
burden of proof1"
In contrast to Morley and Bryant, other decisions have reached
contrary conclusions.'" These conflicting decisions reflect the
uncertainty stemming from the Court's lack of guidance in this area
98. See State v. Bryant, 432 S.E.2d 291 (N.C. 1993), vacated, 114 S. Ct. 1365, on
remand, 446 S.E.2d 71 (N.C. 1994).
99. See Morley v. Stenberg, 828 F. Supp. 1413 (D. Neb. 1993), rev'd, 25 F.3d 687 (8th
Cir. 1994).
100. 432 S.E.2d 291 (N.C. 1993), vacated, 114 S. Ct. 1365, on remand, 446 S.E.2d 71
(N.C. 1994).
101. Id. at 298. The defendant, appealing a conviction of first degree murder, argued
successfully to the court that the instruction defining reasonable doubt at his trial
constituted Cage error. Id. at 294-97.
102. Id. at 298 (Meyer, J., dissenting) (citing Gaskins v. McKellar, 916 F.2d 941 (4th Cir.
1990), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 961 (1991)); see, e.g., Smith v. State, 588 So. 2d 561, 568-69
(Ala. Crim. App. 1991) (finding use of terms "moral certainty" and "actual and substantial
doubt" proper); Bradford v. State, 412 S.E.2d 534, 536 (Ga. 1992) (holding that the
instruction was permissible when court used only "moral and reasonable certainty");
Commonwealth v. Beldotti, 567 N.E.2d 1219, 1225 (Mass. 1991) (holding that use of the
words "moral certainty" within an otherwise acceptable charge does not constitute error).
103. 828 F. Supp. 1413 (D. Neb. 1993), rev'd, 25 F.3d 687 (8th Cir. 1994).
104. Id. at 1419.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 1418-23.
107. See supra notes 96, 102.
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of the law; °8 more generally, the differences in these cases illustrate
the questions Cage left open. The uncertainties surrounding
Cage-highlighted in Bryant and Morley-also reflect the varied and
disordered treatment the courts have accorded the reasonable doubt
standard.'" These uncertainties result, in part, from the Supreme
Court's failure to decide whether courts even must define the phrase
"reasonable doubt.""'  This uncertainty has led to procedural
disorder among both state and federal courts."' For example, the
First and Second Circuits recently held that, while reasonable doubt
needs no defining or refining, defining the term is not error per
se."2 The Fourth Circuit has held that "the term reasonable doubt
itself has a self-evident meaning comprehensible to the lay juror,"''
and that the better practice is to decline defining the term.' The
Ninth Circuit recently held that a district court did not abuse its
108. See supra notes 63-97 and accompanying text.
109. See infra notes 111-26 and accompanying text.
110. The Court declined to address this issue in Victor. "Because the trial judges in fact
defined reasonable doubt in both jury charges we review, we need not decide whether the
Constitution required them to do so." Victor, 114 S. Ct. at 1253 (Ginsburg, J., concurring
in part and concurring in the judgment).
111. For an exhaustive survey of the dissent among the federal and state courts, see
Diamond, supra note 64, at 1717-21, 1736 (concluding that courts should always define
reasonable doubt).
112. See United States v. Whiting, 28 F.3d 1296, 1303 (1st Cir.) (holding that "[t]his
circuit has repeatedly refused to require the district courts to define 'reasonable doubt' in
their instructions to the jury"), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 378 (1994); Perez v. Irwin, 963 F.2d
499 (2d Cir. 1992) (stating that although defining is not a violation per se, repeatedly
defining reasonable doubt as a "doubt to a moral certainty" diluted the government's
burden of proof so as to violate petitioner's rights); United States v. Campbell, 874 F.2d
838, 843 (1st Cir. 1989) (holding that reasonable doubt does not require defining); cf. Dunn
v. Perrin, 570 F.2d 21, 23 (1st Cir.) ("Reasonable doubt is at best a difficult concept to
explain to a lay jury."), cert. denied, 437 U.S. 910 (1978).
113. Murphy v. Holland, 776 F.2d 470, 475 (4th Cir. 1985), vacated, 475 U.S. 1138
(1986).
114. E.g., United States v. Adkins, 937 F.2d 947, 950 (4th Cir. 1991) ("This circuit has
repeatedly warned against giving the jury definitions of reasonable doubt, because
definitions tend to impermissibly lessen the burden of proof.... The only exception to
our categorical disdain for definition is when the jury specifically requests it."); cf. United
States v. Ricks, 882 F.2d 885, 894 n.12 (4th Cir. 1989) (suggesting that a definition of
reasonable doubt should be given "in those cases where jurors are demonstrably confused
or uncertain"), cert denied, 493 U.S. 1047 (1990); see also United States v. Moss, 756 F.2d
329, 333 (4th Cir. 1985) ("[W]e join in the general condemnation of trial court attempts
to define reasonable doubt.").
An amicus curiae brief filed by the Solicitor General pointed out that the American
Law Institute specifically did not define reasonable doubt in the Model Penal Code
because it believed that defining the term " 'can add nothing helpful to the phrase.' "
Brief for the United States at 9,.Victor v. Nebraska, 114 S. Ct. 1239 (1994) (Nos. 92-8894
& 92-9049) (quoting MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.12 cmt. 190 (1985)).
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discretion by refusing to define the term, provided the reasonable
doubt standard was sufficiently conveyed.1 The Fifth Circuit has
encouraged, though not required, the district courts in its circuit to
use the circuit's pattern jury instruction."6 The Sixth Circuit has
also acknowledged the difficulties in defining reasonable doubt"7
and has demonstrated a preference for the "hesitate to act standard,"
although it does not require its use."8 While the Seventh Circuit
has held that no attempt should be made to define reasonable
doubt,"9 the Tenth Circuit has stated in dictum that a defendant is
entitled to have reasonable doubt defined for the jury.20 In
contrast, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
recently stated that "a District Court need not give any definition of
reasonable doubt at all.' 2'
The highest state courts are also in discord."z For instance, the
highest courts of North Carolina and Florida have held that no
definition of reasonable doubt need be given unless specifically
requested."2  Other states such as California and Nevada have
statutory definitions of reasonable doubt.24 Two state courts have
deemed a trial court's attempt to define the term reversible error.'
115. See United States v. Nolasco, 926 F. 2d 869, 873 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct.
111 (1991).
116. See United States v. Williams, 20 F.3d 125, 129 n.2 (5th Cir. 1994) (stating that
adopting the pattern instruction would add " 'a measure of uniformity ... [and] render
appellate review easier and quicker' ") (citing United States v. Hunt, 794 F.2d 1095, 1101
(5th Cir. 1986)), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 239 (1994).
117. See Whiteside v. Parke, 705 F.2d 869, 871 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 843
(1983).
118. United States v. Goodlett, 3 F.3d 976, 979 (6th Cir. 1993).
119. United States v. Hall, 854 F.2d 1036,1039 (7th Cir. 1988) (concluding that "at best,
definitions of reasonable doubt are unhelpful to a jury... [and] attempt[ing] to define
reasonable doubt presents a risk without any real benefit"). The Seventh Circuit's ap-
proach in Hall is contrary to the weight of authority. See, e.g., United States v. Moss, 756
F.2d 329,333 (4th Cir. 1985) ("Mere attempts to define reasonable doubt do not, however,
constitute reversible error per se."). The Seventh Circuit has also recently held that
reasonable doubt should not be defined even if the jury requests a definition. See United
States v. Blackburn, 992 F.2d 666, 668 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 393 (1993).
120. United States v. Pepe, 501 F.2d 1142, 1143-44 (10th Cir. 1974).
121. United States v. Taylor, 997 F.2d 1551, 1557 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
122. Diamond, supra note 64, at 1718-20.
123. Barwicks v. State, 82 So. 2d 356, 358 (Fla. 1955); State v. Watson, 240 S.E.2d 440,
446 (N.C. 1978); cf. State v. Montgomery, 417 S.E.2d 742,748 (N.C. 1992) ("The trial court
has the duty to define the term 'reasonable doubt' when requested to give such an
instruction to the jury.").
124. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1096 (West 1985); NEv. REv. STAT. § 175.211 (1986).
125. Faubion v. State, 569 P.2d 1022, 1024 (Okla. Crim. App. 1977) (holding that the
cumulative effect of an incorrect definition and other errors constituted reversible error);
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Victor v. Nebraska presented the Court with an opportunity to clarify
what had become a confusing area of the law, both procedurally and
substantively.126
Given the Court's history of analysis when reviewing jury
instructions, however, one might have guessed that the Victor decision
was unlikely to clarify how, or when, to define reasonable doubt.
When the Court considers the validity of jury instructions, "it usually
reviews them only for their legal correctness without paying attention
to the problems of incomprehensibility."'" The Court simply
assumes that jurors will correctly apply the instructions given to them
at trial and avoids delving into the layperson's understanding of the
charge."s  In the Court's own words, "[t]he Court presumes that
jurors, conscious of the gravity of their task, attend closely the
particular language of the trial court's instructions in a criminal case
and strive to understand, make sense of, and follow the instructions
given them.''129  The Court's treatment of the two instructions at
Blakely v. State, 542 P.2d 857, 861 (Wyo. 1975) ("[Tie have given the instruction would
be an attenpt to partially define reasonable doubt... [which] is prohibited.") (citing Cosco
v. State, 521 P.2d 1345, 1346-47 (Wyo. 1974)).
126. As the State of Nebraska argued in its brief, "the confusion resulting from Cage
has, in and of itself, sent tremors through this country's criminal justice system. This is an
opportunity to put that disquiet to rest." Brief for State of Nebraska at 17, Victor v.
Nebraska, 114 S. Ct. 1239 (1994) (No. 92-8894).
127. Tanford, supra note 16, at 88.
128. Alternatively, the Court may ignore the evidence. Professor Tanford explained
that in Carter v. Kentucky, 450 U.S. 288,298-99 (1981), the Court had the opportunity to
put to use the published results of an experiment on jury instructions which indicated that,
when jurors are admonished to disregard evidence of insurance, they do exactly the
opposite of what they are told. The Court ignored the research. Tanford, supra note 16,
at 72 (citing Dale W. Broeder, The University of Chicago Jury Project, 38 NEB. L. REV.
744, 753-54 (1959)).
129. Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 324 n.9 (1985). The Francis Court continued:
"[W]e adhere to the crucial assumption underlying our constitutional system of trial by
jury that jurors carefully follow instructions." Id. at 325 n.9; see also Connecticut v.
Johnson, 460 U.S. 73, 85 n.14 (1983) (quoting ROGER TRAYNOR, THE RIDDLE OF
HARMLESS ERROR 73-74 (1970) ("[W]e must assume that juries for the most part
understand and faithfully follow instructions. The concept of a fair trial encompasses a
decision by a tribunal that has understood and applied the law to all material issues in the
case.") (footnote omitted)); Opper v. United States, 348 U.S. 84, 95 (1954) ("To say that
the jury might have been confused amounts to nothing more than an unfounded
speculation that the jurors disregarded clear instructions from the court.").
For a close examination of the Supreme Court's "unquestionable belief" that juries
will correctly apply the instructions given them, see Tanford, supra note 16, at 88-90 (citing
Coy v. Iowa, 108 S. Ct. 2798, 2810 (1988) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("[W]e must assume
[jurors are] intelligent and capable of following instructions."); Greer v. Miller, 483 U.S.
756,766 n.8 (1987) ("[W]e... presume that a jury will follow an instruction."); Richardson
v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200,206 (1987) (noting the "invariable assumption of the law that jurors
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issue in Victor follows this general pattern of analysis.
In Victor, the Court began by conceding that the reasonable
doubt standard "defies easy explication."'30  This preface
foreshadows an opinion that likewise defies easy explication,
consisting of fine distinctions between words and phrases and their
interrelationships. The Court first analyzed the phrase "moral
evidence."'' Sandoval argued that the phrase "moral evidence" is
antiquated and virtually meaningless to the modern juror.132  The
Court responded with a brief discussion of the phrase's long-standing
association with the concept of reasonable doubt, concluding that
"moral evidence" has not lost its meaning in the past 150 years. 33
The Court then explained that the few modern dictionaries that still
define the term do so consistently with the phrase's original meaning,
and consequently, it is still an acceptable phrase to use when defining
reasonable doubt."
follow their instructions"); City of Los Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 798 (1986)
("[J]uries act in accordance with the instructions given them.")).
Professor Tanford elaborates on one example of the Court's unwillingness to consider
the actual effects jury instructions have on jurors. In Lakeside v. Oregon, 435 U.S. 333
(1978), the defendant asked the judge not to instruct the jury to disregard the defendant's
choice not to testify. Id. at 335. The judge ignored the defendant's request, and the
defendant was convicted. Id. Professor Tanford observed:
The psychology literature supports the defendant's objection. An admonition will
not reduce the likelihood that jurors will draw adverse inferences from the
defendant's silence, but will tend to aggravate its prejudicial impact.... The
Court criticized the defense objection as based on "very doubtful assumptions,"
scoffing at the notion that jurors would "totally disregard the instruction, and
affirmatively give weight to what they have been told not to consider." Of course
the Court is wrong; that is exactly what jurors do.
Tanford, supra note 16, at 89 (footnotes omitted).
130. Victor, 114 S. Ct. at 1242.
131. Id. at 1245-46.
132. Id. at 1245. The phrase "moral evidence" has been the subject of similar
criticisms, most notably in a concurring opinion by Justice Mosk in People v. Brigham, 599
P.2d 100, 107-09 (1979) (Mosk, J., concurring). In Brigham, Justice Mosk maintained:
"[T]he phrase 'moral evidence' has no currency in this last quarter of the 20th century.
Indeed, while its meaning may have been known to legal scholars in 1850, it does not
appear to have been understood by laypersons even at that time." Id. at 108 (Mosk, J.,
concurring).
133. Victor, 114 S. Ct. at 1246 ("We recognize that the phrase 'moral evidence' is not
a mainstay of the modem lexicon, though we do not think it means anything different
today than it did in the 19th century."). The Sandoval and Victor instructions, along with
many other reasonable doubt instructions, are rooted in a charge given by Chief Justice
Shaw of the Massachusetts Supreme Court in 1850. See id at 1244, 1250 (citing
Commonwealth v. Webster, 59 Mass. 295, 320 (1850), overruled in part by Commonwealth
v. McLeod, 326 N.E.2d 905 (Mass. 1975)).
134. Victor, 114 S. Ct. at 1246.
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Yet the crux of the Court's finding that the term "moral
evidence" poses no problem in the Sandoval instruction is that, taken
in context of the entire charge, the phrase would not confuse the
jury.35 The Court stated: "Moral evidence, in this sentence, can
only mean empirical evidence offered to prove such matters-the
proof introduced at trial."'36 The Court added that this conclusion
is "reinforced" by other language in the Sandoval instruction, and that
"the instruction itself gives a definition of the phrase."' 1 The Court
stated that the other language in the charge correctly instructed jurors
to focus on the facts of the case, and not (as Sandoval asserted) on
the morality of Sandoval's acts. 8 Essentially, the Court employed
a text-context distinction to reach its conclusion:'39 When taken in
the context of the charge as a whole, "moral evidence" does not
impair the modem juror's understanding of the reasonable doubt stan-
dard. 4 This text-context approach permeates the entire decision,
including the Court's examination of the next challenged phrase in the
Sandoval charge-"moral certainty."
The phrase "moral certainty" has long been associated with the
definition of reasonable doubt.'4' Its significance is centuries
135. Id. at 1246-47.
136. Id. at 1246 (emphasis added).
137. Id.
138. Id. at 1247.
139. Although the Court did not expressly state in Victor that it applied this type of
analysis, the text-context distinction logically follows other of the Court's decisions. See,
ezg., Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141,146-47 (1973) (holding that it is "well-established...
that a single instruction to a jury may not be judged in artificial isolation but must be
viewed in the context of the overall charge") (citing Boyd v. United States, 271 U.S. 104,
107 (1926)); Holland v. United States, 135 U.S. 121, 140 (1954) (implying that "taken as
a whole, the instructions [must] correctly conve[y] the concept of reasonable doubt to the
jury").
A dissenting opinion by then-Justice Rehnquist, joined by Chief Justice Burger and
Justice O'Connor, is perhaps the precursor to the Court's analysis in Victor.
The Court, instead of examining the charge to the jury as a whole, seems bent
on piling syllogism on syllogism to prove that someone might understand a few
sentences in the charge to allow conviction on less than proof beyond a
reasonable doubt. Such fine parsing of the jury instructions... is not required
by anything in the United States Constitution.
Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 331-32 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
140. Victor, 114 S. Ct. at 1246. But see id at 1251 (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("Calif-
ornia's use of 'moral evidence' is ... most troubling, and to me seems quite indefen-
sible.").
141. See Shapiro, supra note 62, at 153 ("Because it troubles us that 'beyond reasonable
doubt' conveys no very precise meaning, we add a second phrase, 'to a moral certainty,'
but it conveys even less meaning and makes our whole problem worse.").
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old,142 and the phrase is still used in the jury instructions of many
American jurisdictions.43 However, a number of courts have
argued that the phrase should be abandoned.1" As one scholar has
stated, the modem juror probably understands "morally certain"-if
she understands it at all-to mean "very certain,"' 4 5 which, accor-
ding to Sandoval and Victor, unconstitutionally raises the level of
doubt a juror must entertain before reaching an acquittal."4
Moreover, both Victor and Sandoval maintained that the phrase
"moral certainty" suggests to jurors that they may find guilt based on
something other than factual evidence or that they could convict on
142. See id.
143. Id.; see, e.g., Bradford v. State, 412 S.E.2d 534, 536 (Ga. 1992) (holding that the
use of "moral and reasonable certainty" language did not impair charge); Commonwealth
v. Beldotti, 567 N.E.2d 1219, 1225 (Mass. 1991) ("[T]here was no error at all in the use of
the words 'moral certainty.' ").
144. See, e.g., Perez v. Irwin, 963 F.2d 499, 502 (2d Cir. 1992) (holding that the district
court's repeated use of the phrase "doubt to a moral certainty" to define reasonable doubt
"is a plain error of law"); United States v. Drake, 673 F.2d 15, 21 (1st Cir. 1982) (conde-
mning the use of "moral certainty"); Morley v. Stenberg, 828 F. Supp. 1413,1420 (D. Neb.
1993) (holding that the "use of such terminology is improper and potentially misleading"),
rev'd, 25 F.3d 687 (8th Cir. 1994); State v. Gallivan, 53 A. 731, 733 (Conn. 1902) (stating
that moral certainty "is an artificial form of words, having no precise and definite
meaning"); State v. Bryant, 432 S.E.2d 291, 297 (N.C. 1993) ("The correct standard for
conviction beyond a reasonable doubt is evidentiary certainty rather than moral certain-
ty."), vacated, 114 S. Ct. 1365, on remand, 446 S.E.2d 71 (N.C. 1994); Commonwealth v.
Holt, 39 A.2d. 372, 379 (Pa. 1944) (holding that the trial court's reluctance to instruct the
jury to "consider the metaphysical concept of 'moral certainty' " did not prejudice the
defendant). For a thorough criticism of the phrase "moral certainty," see People v.
Brigham, 599 P.2d 100, 107-21 (Cal. 1979) (Mosk, J., concurring).
Justice Mosk argued that "moral certainty" is particularly troublesome when used in
conjunction with "moral evidence," as in the Sandoval instruction:
From the tone of the opinion in Webster it appears... that a person is "morally
certain" when he is as certain as he can be of a fact proved by "moral evidence."
But ... today's jurors have no idea what "moral evidence" is .... [B]ecause
"moral evidence" is proof that by definition is incapable of resulting in certainty,
a person is said to be "morally certain" in this sense when he is as certain as he
can be of a fact which he cannot be certain.
Id. at 111 (Mosk, J., concurring) (citing Commonwealth v. Webster, 59 Mass. 295, 320
(1850)); see also supra note 133 (noting the significance of Webster). Professor Shapiro
stated that Justice Mosk's concurrence "has been a catalyst" in the debate over the
meaning of "moral certainty." Shapiro, supra note 62, at 153.
145. Shapiro, supra note 62, at 153.
146. Victor, 114 S. Ct. at 1245, 1250. Significantly, both the Sandoval and Victor
instructions alternate between trying to define the degree of doubt required for acquittal
and the degree of certainty required for a conviction. This can be especially problematic,
and the petitioners' instructions are not unique in this respect. See Morley, 828 F. Supp.
at 1421 n.9 (noting that attempts to define "reasonable doubt" and "guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt" at the same time essentially compound the existing confusion), rev'd,
25 F.3d 687 (8th Cir. 1994).
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the basis of moral intuition-both of which would be inconsistent
with the reasonable doubt standard.147 Pointing to contemporary
definitions of moral certainty, Sandoval contended that present-day
interpretations of the phrase equate "moral certainty" with a belief
"[b]ased on [a] strong likelihood or firm conviction, rather than on
the actual evidence."'" Additionally, both petitioners contended
that the Court had condemned the use of the phrase "moral certain-
ty" in Cage.149
The Court was willing to concede that " 'moral certainty,'
standing alone, might not be recognized by modem jurors as a
synonym for 'proof beyond a reasonable doubt.' "'0 The Court,
however, qualified its position, noting that this did not in itself make
the Sandoval charge unconstitutional.' The Court explained that
"the moral certainty language cannot be sequestered from its sur-
roundings,"'5 and that, "[a]lthough... moral certainty is ambiguous
in the abstract, the rest of the instruction given in Sandoval's case
lends content to the phrase." 53 The Court further explained that
the jurors were instructed that they must have "an abiding conviction,
to a moral certainty, of the truth of the charge.""5 4 In addition, the
Court stated that, because the judge had already informed the jurors
that matters relating to human affairs are proven by moral evidence,
"in this part of the instruction[] moral certainty can only mean
certainty with respect to human affairs," and rejected Sandoval's
argument that the phrase was too ambiguous.5 ' The Court then
emphasized that the other language in the instruction "reinforced" its
conclusion that, taken in context, use of the phrase "moral certainty"
does not in itself render the charge unconstitutional. 6 Thus, even
though the Court did not condone the use of the phrase, the other
language in the instruction salvaged its use. 7
147. See Victor, 114 S. Ct. at 1247, 1250.
148. Id at 1247 (quoting THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICrIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE 1173 (3d ed. 1992)).
149. See id. at 1248 (citing Cage v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. 39, 41 (1990) (per curium)).
150. Id. at 1247; cf id. at 1252 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and concurring in thejudgment) (agreeing with the Court that "moral certainty" "should be avoided as an
unhelpful way of explaining what reasonable doubt means").
151. Id. at 1247.
152. Id. at 1248.
153. Id. at 1247.
154. Id.
155. Id. (emphasis added).




The Court also used the text-context analysis to differentiate the
Sandoval instruction from the one in Cage.' The Court explained
that, although the phrase "moral certainty" was used in Cage, the con-
text was significantly different. 9 The Cage jurors, moreover, were
told simply that they had to be morally certain that the defendant was
guilty."6 The Court contrasted this with the use of "moral certain-
ty" in the Sandoval instruction, noting that the Sandoval jurors were
instructed that a guilty verdict had to be based on evidence presented
at trial.'6' As a result, the Court concluded that it was not likely
that the jurors in Sandoval's case were misled by the phrase.62
Sandoval's final argument was that the portion of the instruction
equating reasonable doubt with "not a mere possible doubt" lessened
the government's burden of proof' 6 The Court noted that the
Cage instruction contained nearly the same phrase, but observed that
Cage never intimated that there was anything wrong with its use."6
Still, the Court stated that "possible" in this context does not mean
any possible doubt, and that this interpretation "is made clear from
the final phrase of the sentence, which notes that everything 'is open
to some possible or imaginary doubt.' "" Again, the context, rather
than the text in isolation, controlled the Court's analysis.
Although the instructions given at Victor's trial closely resembled
the Sandoval instruction, the Justices divided over the constitutionality
of the Victor instruction."' The first phrase at issue in Victor was
"actual and substantial doubt."'67 More than a decade ago, Justice
Marshall argued against using the phrase "substantial doubt" when
defining reasonable doubt, and unsuccessfully urged the Court to rule
on the issue."6 Likewise, the Fourth,'169 Fifth, 70 Sixth,'7 ' and
158. See id. at 1248-49.
159. Id. at 1248.
160. Id.
161. Id. The Court found that the charge instructed jurors that reasonable doubt is
"that state of the case which, after the entire comparison and consideration of all the
evidence, leaves the minds of the jurors in that condition that they cannot say they feel an
abiding conviction, to a moral certainty, of the truth of the charge." Id.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 1248-49.
164. Id. at 1248.
165. Id. at 1248-49.
166. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
167. See Victor, 114 S. Ct at 1249.
168. See Adams v. South Carolina, 464 U.S. 1023, 1025 (1983) (Marshall, J., dissenting
in denial of certiorari) ("I continue to believe that trial courts err when they instruct juries
that a reasonable doubt means 'a substantial doubt....' "); Butler v. South Carolina, 459
U.S. 932, 934 (1982) (Marshall, J., dissenting in denial of certiorari) ("At a minimum,
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Seventh' Circuits have also cautioned against using the phrase.
Victor contended that a substantial doubt is inconsistent with the
notion of a reasonable doubt because the common definition of
"substantial" equates the term with "that specified to a large
degree.'" Victor argued that given the term's common meaning,
a juror may possess a reasonable doubt sufficient to acquit under
Winship, yet still not believe that his doubt is sufficiently substantial
to acquit. 4 Victor also argued that the Court had condemned the
use of "substantial doubt" in Cage, and that the trial judge had
therefore erred by including it in his instruction."
The majority acknowledged that equating a reasonable doubt
with a substantial doubt "is somewhat problematic,"'76 and that re-
quiring jurors to possess a substantial doubt before they can reach an
acquittal could violate the standards of Winship.' However, the
Court defended the "substantial doubt" language, explaining that
"[a]ny ambiguity... is removed by reading the phrase in the context
of the sentence in which it appears."' 8 The relevant portion of the
Victor instruction reads as follows: "A reasonable doubt is an actual
and substantial doubt.., as distinguished from a doubt arising from
mere possibility, from bare imagination, or from fanciful conjc-
instructions equating reasonable doubt with 'substantial doubt' can confuse the jury about
the proper standard of proof.").
169. See Adams v. Aiken, 965 F.2d 1306, 1311 (4th Cir. 1992), vacated, 114 S. Ct. 1365
(1994).
170. See United States v. Muckenstrum, 515 F.2d 568, 571 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 1032 (1975); cf. United States v. Alvero, 470 F.2d 981, 983 (5th Cir. 1972) (criticizing
the use of "very substantial doubt").
171. See United States v. Christy, 444 F.2d 448, 450-51 (6th Cir.) (criticizing the trial
court's use of "substantial doubt" in the jury instruction, yet finding no prejudicial error
because the trial judge used the words "reasonable doubt" at least nine times without
reference to "substantial doubt"), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 949 (1971).
172. See United States v. Wright, 542 F.2d 975, 986-88 (7th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 1073 (1977).
173. Victor, 114 S. Ct. at 1250 (citing WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATINAL
DICrONARY 2280 (unabr. 1981)).
174. Id.
175. 1& More precisely, the Cage instruction contained the phrase "actual substantial
doubt," while the Victor instruction used "actual and substantial doubt." See supra text
accompanying notes 35, 92 (highlighting the Victor and Cage instructions, respectively).
176. Victor, 114 S. Ct. at 1250; cf United States v. Daniels, 986 F.2d 451, 456-57 (11th
Cir. 1993) (upholding an instruction equating a reasonable doubt with "a real doubt"
because the term does not carry the same connotation as "substantial doubt"), cert. denied,
114 S. Ct. 1615 (1994).




ture."'79  The Court stated that this surrounding language distin-
guished the Victor instruction from the Cage instruction because the
distinction between a substantial doubt and a "fanciful conjecture"
was not made in Cage."s
The Court further distinguished Cage, holding in Victor that the
language at issue in Cage-"grave uncertainty," "actual substantial
doubt," and "moral certainty"-must also be viewed in relation to the
charge as a whole.'' The Court stated:
[W]e did not hold [in Cage] that the reference to substantial
doubt alone was sufficient to render the instruction un-
constitutional.... Rather, we were concerned that the jury
would interpret the term "substantial doubt" in parallel with
the preceding reference to "grave uncertainty," leading to an
overstatement of the doubt necessary to* acquit."
The Court then used this clarification of Cage to differentiate the
Cage instruction from the Victor instruction. First, the potential
problem of interpreting "substantial doubt" in parallel reference with
"grave uncertainty" does not exist in the Victor (or Sandoval)
instruction because the latter term is wholly absent from these
cases.as Second, in the Court's view, the reference to substantial
doubt in Victor's instruction is sanitized by its context: "[T]he context
makes clear that 'substantial' is used in the sense of existence rather
than magnitude of the doubt."'' Third, the instruction provided an
alternative definition of reasonable doubt-the hesitate-to-act
standard-which informed the jury how substantial a doubt must
be." Therefore, the Court concluded that Victor's objection to the
phrase was unfounded."
The next part of the Victor analysis focused on the moral
179. Id. at 1249.
180. Id. at 1250 ("[In Cage] we did not hold that the reference to substantial doubt
alone was sufficient to render the instruction unconstitutional."); cf. Taylor v. Kentucky,
436 U.S. 478, 488 (1978) (noting that equating reasonable doubt with "a substantial doubt,
... though perhaps not in itself reversible error, often has been criticized as confusing").
181. Victor, 114 S. Ct. at 1250.
182. Id. In its interpretation of Cage, the Court explicitly rejected the broad reading
of Cage in Morley v. Stenberg, 828 F. Supp. 1413 (D. Neb. 1993), rev'd 25 F.3d 687 (8th
Cir. 1994). Id.; see supra notes 103-06 and accompanying text (detailing the Morley
decision). Likewise, the Court implicitly rejected the North Carolina Supreme Court's
analysis in State v. Bryant, 432 S.E.2d 291 (N.C. 1993), vacated, 114 S. Ct. 1365 (1994). See
supra notes 100-02 and accompanying text (describing the Bryant decision).
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certainty portion of the charge. Victor objected to this phrase for
essentially the same reasons as Sandoval: s The language suggests
that a juror can convict based on probabilities or firm conviction
rather than on the standard established in Winship." Again, the
Court distinguished the use of the phrase in Victor's instruction from
its use in Cage by explaining that the Cage instruction provided
"insufficient context" to make a meaningful comparison." 9  The
Court conceded that "the phrase moral certainty might be
misunderstood in the abstract," but this concern ostensibly is not
present in the Victor charge because the jurors also were told that
they must have an "abiding conviction of the defendant's guilt."'"
Finally, Victor likened his instructions to those in Cage by noting
that both instructions suggested to the jurors that guilt may be based
on the "strong probabilities" of the case.19' Victor objected to this
phrase, arguing that the "strong probabilities" language suggests to
jurors that they may convict on the probabilities of the case even if
not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt." The Court summarily
rejected Victor's argument, noting that the phrase, when taken in
context of the sentence in which it appears, instructs the jury that the
probabilities must be strong enough to satisfy the Winship stan-
dard.'93 Thus, the Court concluded, as it did in the Sandoval
analysis, that a reasonable likelihood existed that the jury correctly
understood the instructions consistent with the reasonable doubt
187. See supra notes 141-49 and accompanying text.
188. Victor, 114 S. Ct. at 1243.
189. Id. at 1250.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 1251. Sandoval made essentially the same objection. While Victor
challenged the direct use of the phrase "strong probabilities" in his instruction, id., San-
doval argued that the phrase "moral certainty" impliedly referred to the term, id. at 1247-
48.
192. Victor, 114 S. Ct. at 1251; c. id. at 1252 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment) (arguing against the use of the "strong probabilities" lan-
guage); Morley v. Stenberg, 828 F. Supp. 1413, 1423 (D. Neb. 1993) (holding that "strong
probability suggests a burden of proof lower than proof beyond a reasonable doubt"),
rev'd, 25 F.3d 687 (8th Cir 1994). The Morley court made the following analogy:
[I]f a mechanic told a driver there was a "strong probability" the car's brakes
would work properly, the driver would likely feel much less confident driving
down Pike's Peak than if the mechanic told the driver it was "certain beyond all
reasonable doubt" that the car's brakes would function properly.
Id. at 1423 n.13.
193. Victor, 114 S. Ct at 1251. The Court also stated that "the beyond a reasonable
doubt standard is itself probablistic," and noted that the Winship Court held that "all the
factfinder can acquire is a belief of what probably happened." Id at 1247 (quoting In re
Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 370 (1970)).
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standard. 4
Justice Blackmun's opinion, concurring in part and dissenting in
part, criticized only the majority's treatment of the Victor instruction,
arguing that "[t]here is no meaningful difference between the jury
instruction delivered at Victor's trial and the jury instruction at issue
in Cage."' 5 Employing the same text-context analysis used by the
majority, Justice Blackmun noted that the Court managed to
distinguish the Victor instruction from the unconstitutional charge in
Cage on the basis of two words: "grave uncertainty."'9 6  Justice
Blackmun denounced the majority's conclusion that "the moral
certainty language is sanitized by its context" in the Victor instruc-
tion,"w finding that the context is virtually identical to that in
Cage. 8 Justice Blackmun pointed out that both the Cage and
Victor instructions equate a reasonable doubt with "substantial
doubt," and both make reference to "moral certainty" rather than
"evidentiary certainty.""'
Justice Blackmun then turned specifically to the "substantial
doubt" language and contended, contrary to the majority, that both
the Cage and Victor instructions used "substantial doubt" to distin-
guish reasonable doubt from mere conjecture.2 ° Justice Blackmun
194. It. at 1251.
195. Id. at 1254 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
196. Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring in part And dissenting in part). Justice Blackmun
also used this text-context analysis to distinguish Victor's instruction from Sandoval's,
stating that in the Victor instruction, "the misleading language is mutually reinforcing,
both overstating the degree of doubt necessary to acquit and understating the degree of
certainty required to convict." IM. at 1259 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
197. Id. at 1256 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
198. Id at 1254 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Black-
mun stated that the absence of "grave uncertainty" from the Victor instruction did not help
the State because the other misleading language, such as the reference to "strong
probabilities," rendered the charge unconstitutional. Id. at 1256-57 (Blackmun, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). Even though the instruction qualifies the term
"strong probabilities" by noting that " 'the strong probabilities of the case' should be
'strong enough to exclude any doubt of his guilt that is reasonable,' "Justice Blackmun
asserted that the qualification is useless because the phrase "doubt of his guilt that is
reasonable" is defined in the very next sentence as a "substantial doubt." Id. at 1258
(Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). In other words, one ambiguous
phrase is used to define another, leading Justice Blackmun to conclude that the purported
clarification only adds to the confusion. See id. (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
199. Id. at 1255 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
200. Id. at 1256 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("The Cage
instruction plainly states that a reasonable doubt is a doubt 'founded upon a real tangible
substantial basis and not upon mere caprice and conjecture.' ").
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argued that the "substantial doubt" language itself was condemned in
Cage because it was misleading, not because there was an "absence
of appropriate contrasting language., 211  In the same manner,
Justice Blackmun criticized the majority's preoccupation with the
relationship between "substantial doubt" and "grave uncertainty,"
arguing that equating reasonable doubt with substantial doubt alone
unconstitutionally overstated the degree of doubt required for acquit-
tal.202
According to Justice Blackmun, the majority parsed the instruc-
tion rather than viewing it as a whole, thus failing to examine the
relationship between the challenged terms and their cumulative
effect.0' Justice Blackmun argued that "[the] relationship between
the 'moral certainty' language, which potentially understates the
degree of certainty required to convict, and the 'substantial doubt,'
'strong probabilities,' and 'possibly you may be mistaken' language
.. overstates the degree of doubt necessary to acquit. '' 2°4 In sum,
"[t]his confusing and misleading state of affairs" led Justice Blackmun
to conclude that there was a "reasonable likelihood" that the jury
interpreted the Victor instruction in a manner inconsistent with due
process.205
The text-context distinction employed by the majority and Justice
Blackmun is confusing at best, and the significance of the Victor
decision lies in this confusion. In its preoccupation with this overly
complex analysis, the Court failed to see that jury instructions in
general, and the Sandoval and Victor instructions in particular, are
often so far removed from the rest of the trial, and cast in such
incomprehensible language2 6-albeit legally correct language-that
jurors cannot understand them, much less apply them in the intended
manner. To the layperson or the lawyer, perhaps no significant
difference in meaning exists between the Cage instructions and those
201. Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
202. Id. at 1256-57 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
203. Id. at 1258 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
204. Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
205. Id. at 1259 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
206. Professor Tanford observed:
The abstract nature of many instructions also interferes with comprehension. Ap-
parently in an effort to avoid commenting on the evidence, American judges tend
not to place legal concepts in the context of the actual facts of the case.
Psychologists have demonstrated that knowledge of context is necessary for
effective comprehension ....
Tanford, supra note 16, at 82-83 (footnote omitted).
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given at Victor's or Sandoval's trial.'
Despite the convincing empirical studies establishing the
problems with juror comprehension, the Court reads the Victor and
Sandoval instructions as "looking-glass charges,"'  which will
convey the reasonable doubt standard to the jury simply because they
are legally sufficient. Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion in Victor
says it best: "[S]ome of the phrases here in question confuse far more
than they clarify ... [Flor jurors who have not had the benefit of the
Court's research; the words will do nothing but baffle."' Despite
Justice Kennedy's warning, the Court remained consistent with its
history of ignoring questions of juror comprehension.10 In fact,
Justice Ginsburg voiced the only reference to the empirical studies on
juror comprehension in her concurring opinion.2 ' Yet she sum-
marly dismissed the problem, concluding that using the Federal
Judicial Center's proposed definition of reasonable doubt would clear
up the confusion.212
Victor does very little to clarify the reasonable doubt standard.
How to define reasonable doubt, if at all, is still not clear. Also
unclear is whether a certain phrase may be impermissible in one
instruction, yet permissible in another because other language is able
to salvage the instruction as a whole. Had other phrases been used
207. Cf Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370, 380-81 (1990) ("Jurors do not sit in solitary
isolation booths parsing instructions for subtle shades of meaning in the same way that
lawyers might.").
208. This analogy stems from Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 339-40 (1985)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("[E]ither the Court is attributing qualities to the average juror
that are found in very few lawyers, or it perversely reads the instructions as a
'looking-glass charge which, when held to a mirror, reads more clearly.' "). The "looking-
glass" reference derives from the following passage in the classic, Through the Looking-
Glass: "[Alice] puzzled over this for some time, but at last a bright thought struck her.
'Why, it's a Looking-glass book, of course! And, if I hold it up to a glass, the words will
all go the right way again.' " LEWIS CARROLL, THROUGH THE LOOKING-GLASS 19-20
(Bramhall House 1960) (1871).
209. Victor, 114 S. Ct. at 1251 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Nevertheless, Justice Kennedy
concluded that both charges were constitutional. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
210. See supra notes 126-29 and accompanying text.
211. Victor, 114 S. Ct. at 1253 (Ginsburg, J., concurring.)
212. Id. at 1253 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). Justice Ginsburg's proposal may not be the
panacea. While no circuit has held that a definition of reasonable doubt modeled on the
Federal Judicial Center's Pattern Instruction constitutes reversible error, several circuits
have been critical of its use. See United States v. Velasquez, 980 F.2d 1275, 1278-79 (9th
Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2979 (1993); United States v. Barrera-Gonzales, 952 F.2d
1269, 1273 (10th Cir. 1992); United States v. Porter, 821 F.2d 968, 973 (4th Cir. 1987), cert.
denied, 485 U.S. 934 (1988); United States v. McBride, 786 F.2d 45, 52 (2d Cir. 1986);
United States v. Gibson, 726 F.2d 869, 874 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 960 (1984).
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in either the Victor or Sandoval instruction, or had the existing
phrases been presented in a slightly different context, perhaps the
Court would have found error. Exactly what would have been
required to render the instructions unconstitutional is far from certain.
Similarly, while Victor purports to clarify Cage, the decision intimates
that were language in Cage presented in a different context, the Court
may have found that instruction constitutional as well.
Victor centers around juror comprehension, yet ironically the
Court is able to decide the case while effectively avoiding this central
issue. The text-context distinction perpetuates the misguided
assumption that jurors understand and follow the instructions given
them. Evading the issue of juror comprehension also enables the
Court to avoid casting doubt on the effectiveness of the entire jury
trial.2"3 In addition, by using the text-context distinction to uphold
petitioners' jury instructions, the Court avoids addressing the validity
of other convictions obtained using the same or similar instructions.
The Court also purposely dodges the real issue in Victor-what
does "proof beyond a reasonable doubt" really mean, and how, if at
all, can its meaning be conveyed? Perhaps Victor marks an effort by
the Court to move away from Cage's unavailing attempt to regulate
the reasonable doubt standard. Moreover, perhaps Victor illustrates
that the Court has no solution to the reasonable doubt dilemma, and
it simply should stay out of this area of the law.
The text-context distinction is inherently confusing; text and its
context are intertwined and not as easily separable as the Court
indicates. Although the Court stated that it examines the jury
instructions as a whole, this examination ultimately entails isolating
the text of those instructions. The slight nuances and distinctions the
Court draws are difficult to interpret; even more daunting is the task
of applying the Court's analysis in any consistent manner. The only
thing clear after Victor is that the confusion surrounding the
reasonable doubt standard will not dissipate.
MATr NICHOLS
213. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) ("[U]se of the reasonable-doubt stan-
dard is indispensable to command the respect and confidence of the community in ap,
plications of the criminal law.").
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